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Abstract
This paper introduces a learning algorithm that allows for imitation in recursive
dynamic games. The Kiyotaki}Wright model of money is a well-known example of such
decision environments. In this context, learning by experience has been studied before.
Here, we introduce imitation as an additional channel for learning. In numerical simula-
tions, we observe that the presence of imitation either speeds up social convergence to the
theoretical Markov}Nash equilibrium or leads every agent of the same type to the same
mode of suboptimal behavior. We observe an increase in the probability of convergence
to equilibrium, as the incentives for optimal play become more pronounced. ( 1999
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1. Introduction
This paper introduces the idea that agents use imitation of social values in
their learning process. We describe a learning algorithm which incorporates
individual and social learning in recursive decision environments. In numerical
simulations, we show that the presence of imitation matters a lot under some
economic environments.
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In repeated static decision problems, imitation is studied by Ellison and
Fudenberg (1993), Schlag (1998) and O!erman and Sonnemans (1998). In his
theoretical work Schlag (1998) allows for the imitation of the action of one other
agent, depending on his performance in the last period. In another theoretical
paper, Ellison and Fudenberg (1993) study a similar rule of thumb for social
learning. In both studies, historical data beyond one period is ignored by agents.
In the experimental study of O!erman and Sonnemans (1998), subjects are
observed to imitate forecasts of successful players whenever they have access to
this information. In the learning algorithm that we suggest here, the agents
occasionally imitate the social values, which are composed of individual values,
attached to particular strategies. This approach, makes the social learning
model usable in recursive dynamic settings as well.
In dynamic decision problems, learning by experience is studied by Lettau
and Uhlig (1995) and Marimon et al. (1990). Lettau and Uhlig (1995) explore the
theoretical performance of an individual learning algorithm for an agent that is
faced with a dynamic optimization problem. In contrast, Marimon et al. (1990)
run numerical simulations of a similar algorithm, to model learning by experi-
ence in a recursive dynamic game, namely, the Kiyotaki}Wright economy.
Here, we introduce learning by imitation in dynamic decision contexts. In
numerical simulations, we apply our suggested learning algorithm to the
Kiyotaki}Wright economy and contrast our results with the simulation results
of Marimon et al. (1990) and the experimental results of Brown (1996) and Du!y
and Ochs (1996). We observe that the presence of imitation speeds up conver-
gence and homogenizes behavior. However, there is a possibility of convergence
to a suboptimal mode of behavior as well. Such cases are observed when the
payo!s from the suboptimal play and optimal play are very close to each other.
Moreover, the likelihood of observing this possibility approaches zero, as the
incentives for optimal play become more pronounced.
The next section describes the Kiyotaki}Wright model of money. Section 3
gives the details of our learning model in this context. Section 4 presents our
main results. The "nal section concludes with a brief discussion of the results.
The detailed algorithm can be found in the appendix.
2. The Kiyotaki}Wright model
In the economy described by Kiyotaki and Wright (1989), there are three
indivisible goods: 1, 2, and 3. They are all storable but at a cost in terms of utility.
Goods 1 and 3 have the lowest and highest storage cost, respectively. There are
three types of in"nitely lived agents: 1, 2 and 3. Type 1 enjoys consuming Good
1 but derives no utility from consuming the other goods. Likewise, Goods 2 and
3 are the favorites of Types 2 and 3, respectively. A continuum of each type is
present in the economy. Each agent has one unit of storage capacity and is
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endowed with one unit of a good to start with. Agents are specialized in
production. As soon as consumption takes place, Goods 2, 3 and 1 are produced
by Types 1, 2 and 3, respectively. They all get disutility from production.
There is no central clearing house, instead there is a trade round in the
beginning of each period. In a trade round, agents are randomly matched in
pairs and they either trade by exchanging their inventories or choose not to
trade and wait for the next period’s match. Trade takes place if and only if they
both agree on it. Immediately after the trade round, the consumption decision
takes place. If an agent decides to consume, he enjoys some utility, produces one
unit of his production good and incurs some loss in the form of disutility from
production. Right after this decision, the storage cost of the good left at hand is
subtracted from the current utility. Then the agent enters the next period and the
economy repeats itself.
Under the above production and preference pattern, this market organization
does not allow the agents to produce and consume in every period, due to
a mutual inconsistency in needs. Some of the agents have to accept and
temporarily hold a good that they dislike, to facilite mutually bene"cial trade.
This good will serve as a medium of exchange. Which agent accepts which good
as a medium exchange will be determined endogenously by the Markov}Nash
equilibrium concept.
The objective function of a Type i agent is given by
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for all i"1, 2, 3.
The strategies of each player consists of trade o!er and consumption policy
functions. Since any agent can hold only one of the three goods at a point in
time, after two agents are matched, there are nine possible pre-trade states for
each one of them. The trade o!er function maps these nine states to the set M0, 1N.
Here, 1 stands for &o!er trade’ and 0 for &do not o!er trade’. Similarly, after every
trade round, there are three possible pre-consumption states and the consump-
tion function maps these to M0, 1N, 0 meaning &do not consume’ and 1 meaning
&consume’. Clearly, the value of the objective function depends not only on the
agent’s strategies but also on those of the other agents and the initial distribu-
tion of goods over agents.
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Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) have studied the steady-state Nash equilibrium
strategies for all possible ranges of parameters. They have shown that, if the
storage cost di!erence between Goods 3 and 2 is su$ciently large, compared to
the discounted net utility obtained from the consumption good of a Type
1 agent, or more speci"cally for parameter values satisfying
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the unique equilibrium is the &fundamental’ one. In a fundamental equilibrium,
Type 1 agents do not accept Good 3 as a medium of exchange and tend to keep
their production good, Good 2, in hand waiting for a suitable match in the next
period. For any set of parameter values satisfying condition (1), the unique
equilibrium inventory distribution is given in the left panel of Table 1. The term
fundamental equilibrium is used in the sense that only the good with the lowest
storage cost, i.e. Good 1, serves as a medium of exchange.
In a trade round, each agent obviously accepts his own consumption good.
Furthermore, Good 1 is acceptable by Type 2 agents since it has the same
marketability as Good 3 but its storage cost is lower. Type 3 agents, knowing
that their production good, i.e. Good 1, is accepted by both Types 1 and 2, will
not use Good 2 as a medium of exchange. For Type 1 agents, however, their
production good, i.e. Good 2, has limited marketability. Therefore, they would
accept Good 3 in exchange for Good 2 if and only if the marketability advantage
of Good 3 over Good 2 exceeds the storage cost disadvantage. This idea is
captured by inequality (2) below,
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where p
ij
denotes the proportion of Type i agents entering the trade round with
Good j. In this inequality, p
21
/3 and p
31
/3 are the probabilities of Type 1 agent
being matched to an agent of Types 2 and 3, respectively, carrying Good 1 in his
inventory.
Table 1
Type distribution over goods at the pre-trade stage
Fundamental equilibrium Speculative equilibrium
Agent Good 1 Good 2 Good 3 Good 1 Good 2 Good 3
Type 1 0 1 0 0 0.71 0.29
Type 2 0.5 0 0.5 0.59 0 0.41
Type 3 1 0 0 1 0 0
Note: The table reports the equilibrium densities of agents over stocks of goods when they enter the
trade round under fundamental and speculative parameters.
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Since these are the only types who would accept Goods 2 and 3, respectively
(p
31
!p
21
)/3 indicates the extent of the marketability di!erence between Goods
3 and 2 in the next period. Multiplication by the utility value and discounting
converts marketability to current utility terms. The left-hand side is the di!er-
ence between the costs of holding Goods 3 and 2. The inequality, then, is
a condition for Good 3 to be acceptable by Type 1 agents.1 Notice from Table
1 that p
31
"1 and p
21
"0.5, which means under condition (1) that inequality (2)
is not satis"ed and, hence, the Type 1 agents will not accept Good 3 as a medium
of exchange in the fundamental equilibrium. As a consequence, in the funda-
mental equilibrium, only Good 1 will be used by Type 2 agents as a medium of
exchange.
A more interesting situation arises as the unique equilibrium when parameter
values satisfy,
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This equilibrium is called &speculative’, since in addition to Good 1 being
accepted by Type 2 agents, Good 3, which has the highest storage cost, becomes
acceptable by Type 1 agents. For any parameter value satisfying condition (3),
the equilibrium inventory distribution is also given in Table 1.
In the speculative equilibrium, the strategies of Types 2 and 3 agents are the
same as those in the fundamental equilibrium. From Table 1, it is clearly seen
that p
21
"0.59 and p
31
"1, hence, inequality (2) is satis"ed this time, thanks to
condition (3). Therefore, Type 1 agents have the marketability advantage of
carrying Good 3, rather than Good 2, in their inventory. This marketability
advantage exceeds the storage cost disadvantage, and now Type 1 agents are
willing to exchange Good 2 for Good 3, which has the highest storage cost.
Therefore, in this case both Goods 1 and 3 are utilized as media of exchange in
the economy.
3. The learning algorithm
In this section, we suppose that the agents operating in a Kiyotaki}Wright
economy do not know the equilibrium strategies and start o! by acting accord-
ing to some randomly held beliefs regarding the values of the possible actions.
While they interact, they will have opportunities of both learning by experience
and by imitation.
1For the derivations and the proofs of the statements here, the reader may refer to the original
Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) paper.
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Table 2
Parameters used in simulations
Good Produced by Consumed by Net utility Storage cost
1 Type 3 Type 1 1.5 0.1
2 Type 1 Type 2 1.5 0.20 or 0.29
3 Type 2 Type 3 1.0 0.3
Number of agents per type 20
Discount factor 0.90
Maximum number of periods 2000
Note: The set of parameter values corresponding to ones used in Brown’s (1996) experimental study
(Set I) and a variant of it (Set II) are shown in the table. In Set I, c
2
"0.20 and in Set II, c
2
"0.29.
Under both sets the unique equilibrium is the speculative one. However, Set II provides relatively
stronger incentives for Type 1 agents to accept Good 3 as a medium of exchange.
To run numerical simulations, we need to have a "nite number of agents of
each type, which we take as 20. The two sets of parameter values that we use in
our simulations, are reported in Table 2.2 Both Sets I and II parameters satisfy
condition (3), so that under both, the unique equilibrium is the speculative one.
The "rst set is, basically, the same as the ones used by Brown in his experimental
study, with the exception of our explicit use of a discount factor (b"0.9) and
a disutility term (D
i
"0.1 for all i), which is not reported in the table. Set II
di!ers from Set I only in the storage cost of Good 2. This makes inequality (3)
and, therefore, Eq. (2) more strict under Set II parameters, and increases the
incentives for Type 1 agents to use the speculative strategy of accepting Good
3 as a medium of exchange.
Each of our Type 1, 2 and 3 agents start period zero by holding Goods 2,
3 and 1 in their inventories, respectively. Then they enter their "rst trading
round.
In our algorithm, as in Marimon et al. (1990), learning and decision making
takes place by means of classi"er systems. A classi"er system is a list of
condition-action statements and an associated real number for each statement.
Each condition-action statement is called a classi"er and the real number
associated with it is called its strength.3 There are three main steps in a learning
2 In Brown (1996), as in our Table 2, the net payo! assigned to Type 3 agents is 0.5 points below
those assigned to Types 1 and 2. The reason for this is, most probably, to economize on the total cost
of the experiment. This asymmetry in utilities is expected to cause no problems in learning, since the
problem faced by Type 3 agents is the simplest among all the three.
3The classi"er systems were introduced to the arti"cial intelligence literature by Holland (1975).
Booker et al. (1989) is also a good reference. For applications in economics, Arthur (1991), Arthur
et al. (1997), Beltrametti et al. (1997), Marimon et al. (1990), Sargent (1993) and Vriend (1996) are
some good references.
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algorithm utilizing a classi"er system: activation, selection and update. These
are described as Steps 1, 3 and 4 below. The intermediate Step 2, which is the
contribution of the present paper, constitutes the imitation step.
1. Recognize your current state and determine the classi"ers whose &condition’
parts are satis"ed in the current state (activation).
2. (Execute this step with probability p
*.*5
) Pick one of the activated classi"ers
randomly and replace its strength with an average of other agents’ strengths
attached to this classi"er (imitation).
3. Pick one classi"er among the activated ones according to their strengths,
follow its advice and bear the consequences (selection).
4. According to the consequences, update the strength of the classi"er respon-
sible from these (update).
5. Go to step 1.
In our economy, regarding Step 1, we assume that each agent has a private
classi"er system that is complete, consisting of trade and consumption classi-
"ers. By completeness we mean that in each possible state and for each possible
action, that can be taken at that state, there is one distinct classi"er. This
assumption means that, the agents are able to recognize fully both their con-
sumption state, i.e. the type of good that they have in hand before consumption,
and their trade state, i.e. the type of own good and the trading partner’s good, in
that period. Since there are only three goods, there are three consumption states
and nine trade states. In a consumption round, for each good there are two
possible classi"ers, one recommending consumption and the other advising to
keep the good. This makes altogether six consumption classi"ers per agent.
Likewise, there are two trade classi"ers for each of the nine trade states o!ering
to and not to trade, which makes a total of 18 trade classi"ers.
In principle, we let our agents follow the recommendation of the classi"er with
the higher strength, in Step 3. However, we also allow for totally random action
with a 5% probability. This both captures the &trembling hand’ notion of Selten
(1975) and, also, is essential as a device for making the agents try the seemingly
bad strategies. As a result, since always two classi"ers are activated in this
model, the seemingly bad classi"er is chosen with 2.5% probability in every
decision situation. The presence of such mistakes is known to be helpful in the
learning process, as they serve as a non-deliberate device for experimentation.4
In Step 3, we draw the initial classi"er strengths from an iid. normal density
function with unit mean and variance. The initial strengths may be interpreted
as prior beliefs regarding the value of each condition-action statement. The
4For example, see Marimon et al. (1990) for mistakes arising from the mutation and crossover
operations of the genetic algorithm and Bas7 c7 m and Orhan (1998) for mistakes arising from trembling
hands.
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update of consumption classi"er strengths takes place according to the formula,
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where S#
t
is the consumption classi"er strength of an agent, who has chosen this
particular rule in period t. q# is an experience counter showing how many times
this particular rule has been chosen in the past. ;
t
, D
t
are the utilities and
disutilities from consumption and production in this period. If consumption did
not take place, these are taken as zero. c
t
is the storage cost of inventory held
from period t to t#1. Finally, Sr
t‘1
is the strength of the trade o!er classi"er,
which is selected in the trade round to take place the next period. This update is
done only after the trade decision in time t#1 is made. Therefore, the e!ects of
trembling hands on Sr
t‘1
are incorporated.
The presence of the discount factor, b, multiplying the strength of the next
period’s chosen trade classi"er, Sr
t‘1
, is to establish the link between the asymp-
totic values of the classi"er strengths and the optimal values coming from the
Bellman’s equation faced by the agent in equilibrium. Once the expected value of
the term in parenthesis is zero for all classi"ers, then we can say that Bellman’s
equation is satis"ed for this consumer, where the optimal value function at
a given state is equal to the maximal classi"er strength at that state. Once the
expected value in the parenthesis becomes equal to zero, the expected value of
the change in the classi"er strengths (S#
t‘1
!S#
t
) is also zero, an indicator that
learning has taken place.5 Immediately after the strength update, the experience
counter is also updated according to q#
t‘1
"q#
t
1. The initial values of the
experience counters are set to 1 for all of the classi"ers.
The update of the trade classi"er strength is made similarly according to,
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where qr is the experience counter for this particular trade classi"er. There is no
utility and discounting term in the equation because the consumption decision is
made right after the trade round. Hence, the strength of the chosen consumption
classi"er summarizes all future payo!s afterwards. If our trade classi"er has sent
us to a strong consumption state, it is rewarded by an increase in its strength.
Otherwise, its strength is reduced. Again, the update of the experience counter
comes immediately after the strength update, qr
t‘1
"qr
t
#1.
5For dynamic problems with a recursive structure this modi"cation of the strength update
formula has been suggested by Lettau and Uhlig (1995), in order to establish a correspondence with
the appropriate dynamic programming problem. Their proofs are based on stochastic approxima-
tion theory, an introductory account of which can be found in Sargent (1993).
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In Step 2, we introduce imitation in the form of occasionally adopting the
social strength attached to a randomly selected one of the activated classi"ers
before a decision is to be made at an observed state. The social strength of a rule
is calculated as the experience weighted average strength, over all agents of the
same type as the agent under consideration. Imitation is assumed to take place,
at a rather low probability, every period. The probability of imitation, p
*.*5
, is
constant across agents and over time. When two agents are matched, two
separate imitation coins are tossed. The agent who observes the &imitate’ side of
the coin, tosses another coin. Accordingly, with equal probabilities either one
of the two active classi"er’s strength is replaced with its social counterpart,
given by
Sl
it
"+20k/1qlktSlkt
+20
k/1
ql
kt
, (6)
where i is the index of the agent to imitate, l is the index of the classi"er that is
selected at the imitation step. This adoption is assumed to be done subcon-
sciously. The implicit mechanism could be as follows. Each agent keeps talking
about his perceived value regarding this particular classi"er, based on his
experience with it. The more experienced ones talk more con"dently, so that
their in#uence on the social average is greater. Occasionally and subconsciously,
an individual agent is a!ected by this social value and adopts it and treats this
number as if it was due to his own experience. Therefore, no update of experi-
ence counters is made at the imitation stage.
4. Results
We have written two versions of a GAUSS program implementing the above
algorithm. The "rst version goes over the algorithm only once and, at the end,
presents a time graph of the proportion of Type 1 agents, who would choose to
trade their production good (Good 2) for Good 3. The second version runs the
algorithm 100 times and reports a di!erent set of statistics. This version reports
a distribution over runs of the proportion of Type 1 agents, who would be
willing to accept Good 3 as a medium of exchange, in trade state (2, 3), at times
50, 1000 and 2000. The second version can be used to study the probability of
social convergence to a particular mode of behavior, while the "rst version can
provide details from a single run.
In a typical run of the "rst version, with zero imitation probability, the
proportion of Type 1 agents, who are willing to accept Good 3 as a medium of
exchange, is plotted as a function of time in Fig. 1. The "gure indicates that even
for Set II parameter values, which provide strong incentives, and even over such
a relatively long time horizon, individual experimentation via mistakes was not
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Fig. 1. Learning under strong incentives and without imitation. The proportion of Type 1 agents
who have learned to accept Good 3 as a medium of exchange is plotted as a function of time. The
imitation rate is zero. Set II parameters, which provide strong incentives for using the speculative
strategy of accepting Good 3 are used. In period 1000, only 75% of the agents have learned to play
the speculative strategy.
su$cient to teach every agent the optimal behavior. At time period 1000, only
around 75% of Type 1 agents were using Good 3 as a medium of exchange.
Another observation is that this proportion kept on #uctuating, even in the last
100 periods. This means that some agents were getting favorable results from
their fresh experimentation of alternative strategies and switching to them and
some agents were getting unfavorable outcomes from their existing strategies
and, hence, switching back to their previous attitudes even after quite some
experience, on the order of 100 trials per classi"er.
For Set II parameter values, again, but with 9% imitation probability this
time, Fig. 2 is drawn for a typical run in which all the agents converged to the
speculative equilibrium. At around period 600 of this run, all Type 1 agents have
started accepting Good 3.6
We also include, for comparison, summary results from a run, in which social
convergence to speculative equilibrium did not take place, but, still, presence of
6The details of how learning evolves in all of the key classi"ers for all types over time are reported
in the discussion paper version of this paper, Bas7 c7 m (1998), which is available from the author upon
request. Bas7 c7 m (1998) also veri"es that the pre-trade inventory distribution over types is in conformity
with the speculative equilibrium, shown in the right panel of Table 1 here.
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Fig. 2. Learning under strong incentives and with imitation. The proportion of Type 1 agents who
have learned to accept Good 3 as a medium of exchange is plotted as a function of time. The
imitation rate is 9%. Set II parameters, which provide strong incentives for using the speculative
strategy of accepting Good 3 are used. In period 600, all of the agents have learned to play the
speculative strategy.
imitation acted in a way to homogenize behavior within the same type. For this
run, Set I parameter values were used. Fig. 3 shows that at around the 900th
time period, none of Type 1 agents were willing to accept Good 3 as a medium of
exchange, even though it would be optimal for them to do so.
Under a positive imitation probability, we have observed two substantially
di!erent convergence patterns in two di!erent runs. To analyze the respective
probabilities of observing these two outcomes in a particular run, we have used
our second program, which generates 100 independent simulation paths for any
given imitation probability.
Table 3 reports the results for Set I parameter values, under which the
incentives to play &speculative’ are rather weak. The "rst striking observation
from the table is that, without imitation, in none of the 100 runs, full social
convergence to a speculative equilibrium was attained, even after 2000 time
periods. As soon as the imitation rate is increased to a small positive number, the
number of runs, with full social convergence as of period 2000, jumps to 21.
A second observation is the tendency to increase in the number of fully
convergent runs by period 1000, with the increase in the rate of imitation. The
third observation is that, in period 2000 there is a rough tendency toward
stabilization of the number of fully convergent runs, at around 40% after the
imitation rate of 6% is exceeded.
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Fig. 3. Learning under weak incentives and with imitation. The proportion of Type 1 agents who
have learned to accept Good 3 as a medium of exchange is plotted as a function of time. The
imitation rate is 9%. Set I parameters, which provide relatively weaker incentives for using the
speculative strategy of accepting Good 3 are used. In period 900, all of the agents are observed to
play the fundamental strategy, although it is suboptimal.
Table 3
The probability (%) of convergence to speculative equilibrium (weak incentives)
Behavioral assumptions Period 50 Period 1000 Period 2000
Rational expectations 100 100 100
Learning with imitation
prob"0.00
0 0 0
Learning with imitation
prob"0.03
0 10 21
Learning with imitation
prob"0.06
0 23 35
Learning with imitation
prob"0.09
0 26 41
Learning with imitation
prob"0.12
0 34 39
Learning with imitation
prob"0.15
0 36 42
Note: The table reports the number of cases out of 100 where all of Type 1 agents learned to accept
Good 3 as a medium of exchange. Set I parameter values, which provide relatively weak incentives
for optimization, are used. Since all the other types learn equilibrium play by time 1000, the reported
numbers can also be interpreted as the probability of convergence to the unique Markov}Nash
equilibrium in a particular run.
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Taking into account the similar behavior of the number of runs that we have
observed to converge to the suboptimal fundamental behavior, we can express
the following conjecture: For any positive imitation rate, the probability of full
convergence to a speculative equilibrium, in a particular run, is around 40% and
the probability of full convergence to the (suboptimal) fundamental behavior is
close to 60%. The justi"cation for this belief comes from the observation that, in
period 2000 the sum of these two extreme cases starts exceeding 90%, for high
imitation probabilities, and has a tendency to increase further, approaching
100% as the number of periods is further increased. Of course, these numbers
are speci"c to Set I parameter values and the 5% trembling hand probability.
A second conjecture, which may be posed, is that higher imitation rates speed up
reaching either one of the two limit points of social convergence, mentioned
above.
To see the e!ects of incentives for optimization on the probability of conver-
gence to the Markov}Nash equilibrium, we run the same program with Set II
parameter values. Table 4 presents the results for this case, which yield stronger
incentives to play &speculative’. Although the same qualitative observations can
be made, the probability of convergence to the speculative equilibrium, in this
case, is observed to be around 90%, which is substantially above the 40%
observed under Set I parameter values. Investigation of the series, which are not
reported in Table 4, reveals that the probability of convergence to the &funda-
mental’ behavior is around 10% in this case (For details and further robustness
and sensitivity checks, see Bas7 c7 m, 1998).
Table 4
The probability (%) of convergence to speculative equilibrium (strong incentives)
Behavioral assumptions Period 50 Period 1000 Period 2000
Rational expectations 100 100 100
Learning with imitation
prob"0.00
0 0 0
Learning with imitation
prob"0.03
0 26 68
Learning with imitation
prob"0.06
0 58 84
Learning with imitation
prob"0.09
0 70 89
Learning with imitation
prob"0.12
0 74 85
Learning with imitation
prob"0.15
0 77 85
Note: To be compared with Table 3. Here, Set II parameter values, which provide stronger
incentives for Type 1 agents to use speculative strategies, are used.
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5. Concluding remarks
In this paper we introduced a learning algorithm which allows the agents to
imitate other agents’ values in dynamic game settings with a recursive structure.
Imitation in this context is the pooling of the diverse group experience, sum-
marized by individual values attached to certain strategies, into social values for
these strategies, and letting the individual agents occasionally adopt these social
values in a random fashion. We applied this algorithm by running numerical
simulations in the context of the Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) model of money as
a medium of exchange.
In contrast to the previous work of Marimon et al. (1990), which studied
learning by experience in the Kiyotaki}Wright framework, we allowed for
imitation. As a consequence, under speculative equilibrium parameter values,
we observed a positive probability of full social convergence to the unique
Markov}Nash equilibrium in a given run. This probability is observed to be
zero, under the absence of imitation. Our second observation has been that the
probability of convergence to the speculative equilibrium approaches one as the
incentives to accept Good 3 as a medium of exchange increase.
Once we set the imitation rate to zero, our algorithm qualitatively mimics the
experimental results of Brown (1996) and Du!y and Ochs (1996). In this case
only a fraction of agents of the same type are observed to learn the optimal play
in reasonable time horizons. Neither Brown (1996) nor Du!y and Ochs (1996)
have allowed their subjects to communicate with each other. Since sharing
attitudes, regarding the values of alternative strategies, was not possible, their
institutional setup allowed for individual learning by experience only. As a re-
sult, only a portion of their subjects learned to play optimally. We would expect
that, in experimental studies, letting the subjects communicate among themsel-
ves will have a non-negligible e!ect on the outcomes.
Based on our experience with the learning algorithm in Kiyotaki}Wright
environment, we can make the following conjectures about the performance of
the model under discrete choice recursive decision environments in general:
1. Learning dynamic optimization takes time, and if incentives to maximize are
not strong enough it may not even take place.
2. Imitation in the form of adopting social values leads to uniformity behavior
across agents of the same type.
3. Imitation speeds up convergence to the uniform behavior mentioned in (2).
4. With imitation, although the convergence, mentioned in (2), is normally to
the optimal behavior, if the incentives to maximize are not very strong, social
convergence to a suboptimal mode of behavior can be observed as well.
These "ndings could be important, for instance, in macroeconomic models,
where imitation is a potentially signi"cant factor in a!ecting the adjustment dyna-
mics that emerge after a major structural change takes place in the economy.
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Appendix A. The algorithm
The algorithm of the GAUSS program, which generates one simulation path
in our arti"cial Kiyotaki}Wright economy, is given below. A modi"ed version
generates 100 independent runs and reports statistics across runs.
Set parameters related to utility, disutility, cost, discount factor,
mistake and imitation probabilities.
Distribute the agents their production goods as their initial
allocation.
Set all initial classifier strengths iid. from N(1,1).
Set initial experience counters to unity.
For time"1 to 1000
Randomly match agents in pairs } by randomly sorting the
60 agents and matching the adjacent ones.
For each pair of agents, N"1 to 30
Determine the pre-trade state for both.
With probability pimit, let first agent imitate by adopting
the social strength of either DOTRADE classifier or
NOTRADE classifier in that state with probability 50%.
With probability pimit, let second agent imitate by adopting
the social strength of either DOTRADE classifier
or NOTRADE classifier in that state with probability 50%.
Pick the stronger classifier’s trade advice for both of the
two agents.
If the first agent’s hand trembles (with probability 5%),
randomly select between two active trade offer classifiers.
If the second agent’s hand trembles (with probability 5%),
randomly select between two active trade offer classifiers.
If t’1, update the strength of the most recently used
consumption classifier by using the most recently chosen
trade classifier’s strength for both agents.
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If both offered trade swap their inventories.
With probability pimit, let first agent imitate by adopting
the social strength of either DOCONSUME classifier
or NOCONSUME classifier in that state with probability 50%.
With probability pimit, let second agent imitate by adopting
the social strength of either DOCONSUME classifier
or NOCONSUME classifier in that state with probability 50%.
Pick the stronger classifier’s consumption advice for both
of the two agents.
If the first agent’s hand trembles (with probability 5%),
randomly select between two active consumption classifiers.
If the second agent’s hand trembles (with probability 5%),
randomly select between two active consumption classifiers.
If the hand trembles with probability 2.5%, choose the
contrary advice for both agents.
If decided to consume, let them produce the good they can.
Update the strength of the most recently used trade classifier
by using the most recently chosen consumption classifier’s
strength for both agents.
Record the proportion of agent who would choose DO consume
and DO trade at this time for all possible states.
Record the end of period stock distribution over agents.
Prepare statistics and report them.
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